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Social norms can be oppressive or empowering; and so can laws. Norms are 
sometimes described as emergent rules or behavioural regularities that arise as 
solutions to collective action problems of various kinds faced by individuals when they 
interact with each other. Examples include rules of combat, courtship rituals, and 
informal systems of property rights that determine what members of a group can do 
with the food they gather and the objects they create, or whom they can marry.3  
The emergence and internalization of norms generally involves an invisible hand 
process similar to Darwin’s idea of natural selection in biology or Smith’s account of 
the operations of markets in economics. In some cases, these ‘invisible processes’ will 
be welfare-enhancing, and when they are, we will refer to them as invisible hands.4 In 
welfare-enhancing cases, a common thought is that the process in which a particular 
norm emerges as the prevailing one involves norms being tried out, with those that 
diminish welfare being filtered out over time, so that through a bottom-up, trial-and-
error process, welfare-enhancing norms emerge victorious and are preserved and 
replicated. Of course, social evolution does not always work like this, and people can 
be trapped at equilibria that are mutually destructive or suboptimal (we call these 
invisible fists).  
The bottom-up emergence of norms is often contrasted with the top-down 
imposition of legislation by larger political units, which tends to displace or alter 
norms. But this contrast is too stark. For example, in representative governments laws 
emerge from the interactions of policymakers and citizens, without any one person 
wielding the power to impose top-down rules on passive subjects. Moreover, 
politicians and voters are themselves subject to prevailing norms, which influence the 
content of the laws that are enacted.5 And the institutions within which policy-makers 
and policy-takers interact are also governed by ‘process norms’ – concerning, say, who 
has voice and how collective decisions are appropriately made. 
In this paper we argue that social norms are emergent orders; that when they are 
welfare-enhancing they constitute invisible hand processes; and that whether we 
should rely more heavily on laws or norms to improve social welfare depends on the 
political institutions in place and the nature of the case under consideration. In other 
words, we argue that there is no general answer to the question of whether norms or 
laws should prevail, in part because both emerge from imperfect, path-dependent 
processes that have their own distinctive advantages and disadvantages. We do, 
however, suggest some general conditions under which it might be better to rely on 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Duke University and UNC Chapel Hill. 
2  Australian National University, Duke University and UNC Chapel Hill. 
3  Elinor Ostrom’s work on informal property rights is an influential example of how norms 
can solve collective action problems. See especially ‘Collective Action and the Evolution of 
Social Norms’ (2000) 14(3) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 137. 
4  This nomenclature is not universal. We shall discuss our reasons for it in section 2 below. 
5  Indeed, it might be argued that norms play a disproportionate role in electoral processes as 
compared with market behaviour. For more on this, see Geoffrey Brennan and Loren 
Lomasky, Democracy and Decision (Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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I   SOCIAL NORMS AS EMERGENT ORDERS 
 
As Suri Ratnapala observes, ‘[t]he idea that all law stems from the will of an 
identifiable law maker remains influential in law schools despite being contradicted by 
the natural history of the human race and by what we know of contemporary society’.6 
Like Hayek and Leoni before him, Ratnapala distinguishes law from legislation, and 
argues against the legal positivist tendency to regard legislation as the primary source 
of social order.7 We broadly agree with Ratnapala on this, though we prefer to contrast 
norms with laws and maintain the contemporary convention of equating law with 
legislation. Throughout the essay, we shall use ‘norms’ and ‘social norms’ 
interchangeably.8  
By laws, then, we mean legislation, usually backed by sanctions, promulgated 
from a formal government with the power to enforce the terms of that legislation on its 
citizens. By norms we mean, roughly, the informal rules that govern the behaviour of 
members of a group. But this is just a first pass.  
In an influential article, Richard McAdams defines norms as ‘informal social 
regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of 
duty, because of fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both’.9 This is a plausible 
definition of social norms that apply to a particular group whose members ‘feel 
obligated to follow’ them. But since social rules or regularities change over time, and 
differ between groups, regularities do not need to make everyone (including dissenters, 
outsiders, and social scientists) feel obligated to follow them in order to count as 
norms. Robert Ellickson provides a simpler definition of social norms as ‘rules 
governing an individual’s behaviour that third parties other than state agents diffusely 
enforce by means of social sanctions’.10 To this we should add that for a rule to exist as 
a norm for a particular group, enough people within the group must believe they 
should follow it.11 Norms are, in this sense, normative: they are action-guiding rules or 
procedures that govern the behaviour of members of a group.  
What it means for individuals to follow the norm will be broadly interpreted. 
Suppose, for example, that there are norms of good performance in an activity like 
operatic singing which are widely endorsed and are used to determine the quality of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Suri Ratnapala, ‘Eighteenth Century Evolutionary Thought and its Relevance in the Age of 
Legislation’ (2001) 12 Constitutional Political Economy 51, 52. 
7  Friedrich Hayek and Bruno Leoni often contrast laws, by which they mean social norms 
(especially norms reflected in English common law), with legislation, by which they mean rules 
promulgated by a legislature. We think this distinction is worth preserving but the terminology is 
unnecessarily confusing, so we stick with the typical contrast between social norms and 
(legislated) laws. See Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press, 
2011) ch 4; and Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law (Liberty Fund, 1991). 
8  We concede that the term ‘norm’ is both vague and ambiguous. But we are interested in social 
norms that regulate social behaviour, rather than personal norms that guide private behaviour. In 
the law and economics tradition, we ignore personal norms, like New Year’s resolutions or vows 
to drink less coffee, and focus instead on rules or regularities that arise in response to conflicts 
between individual rationality and collective welfare. For a detailed discussion of the many uses 
of the term ‘norm’ see Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E Goodin and Nicholas 
Southwood, Explaining Norms (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
9  Richard McAdams, ‘The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms’ (1997) 96(2) 
Michigan Law Review 340.  
10  Robert Ellickson, ‘The Market for Social Norms’ (2001) 3(1) American Law and Economics 
Review 3. 
11  Cristina Bicchieri argues that ‘the very existence of a social norm depends on a sufficient 
number of people believing that it exists and pertains to a given type of situation, and expecting 
that enough other people are following it in those kinds of situations’: The Grammar of Society: 
The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 2. 
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different singers. Not everyone is a singer – and even those who are singers might not 
aspire to professional status – so not everyone observes the relevant norms in their own 
singing. But those norms determine what criteria the general bulk of opera singers 
adopt to evaluate performance and hence the level of esteem and disesteem that 
different performers receive. In a similar sense, there may be norms of heroism in the 
military that all soldiers aspire to, but only a small number realize in their conduct. We 
think that these qualify as norms because a) they are widely endorsed within the 
relevant community (of singers/soldiers), and b) they establish esteem-based incentives 
for individual soldiers to act more heroically or singers to strive to meet the norms of 
good singing. They stand as norms even though few soldiers actually qualify as heroes 
or singers as maestros. In short, we wish to use a more expansive notion of norms than 
some other theorists of the subject adopt: we do not think it necessary that a majority 
of individuals exhibit compliance with the norm in their own behaviour. It may be 
sufficient that they exhibit compliance in their evaluation. 
Norms can be understood as emerging within social groups to solve collective 
action problems in which there is a conflict between individual rationality and social 
welfare. On Cristina Bicchieri’s view, ‘we need social norms in all those situations in 
which there is a conflict of interest but also a potential for joint gain’.12 On this view, 
norms can transform what begin as negative sum games like prisoner’s dilemmas into 
coordination games in which all parties benefit.13  
Usually coordination games are impure, since group members have preferences 
over different possible equilibria in the feasible set. For example, suppose people in a 
tribe living in Madagascar notice that many of their members are not careful about 
cleaning up the carcasses of animals they eat. This creates noxious smells, attracts 
predators, and raises the risk of infectious diseases that all of them would prefer not to 
endure. In the absence of explicit property rights or rules that require everyone to 
dispose of animal carcasses in a more hygienic way, each individual has a strong 
incentive to carry on with the collectively harmful practice since each only bears a 
fraction of the cost of the problem, but gets the full benefit of not exerting extra energy 
to clean up carcasses. In other words, the outcome is a Pareto-inferior Nash 
equilibrium, and the game is an n-person prisoner’s dilemma. 
Now suppose the tribe members understand the problem and at least some of 
them seek a way to solve it. Perhaps a ‘norm entrepreneur’ – someone with exceptional 
charisma and leadership – proposes several solutions.14 This entrepreneur may lack the 
power (or influence) to impose any new norm unilaterally, but he may persuade a few 
tribesmen to change their behaviour, and encourage them to criticize those who do not. 
Others propose alternative social rules, or simply imitate how people around them are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  Ibid 3. 
13  We might say that norms often serve this function: but of course it requires extra argument to 
show that serving that function helps explain a norm’s existence. However, we think that 
requirement is a weak one. After all, the function attributes of norms only have to play some role 
in the explanation of their existence. The fact that norms solve certain collective action problems 
can be a contributory factor in accounting for their origin or for the maintenance of the norm in 
particular cases, without any claim that this line of explanation is the entire story. As Bentham 
put the point in a slightly different connection, the fact that rights serve a particular social 
function no more ensures that rights will emerge than the fact of hunger is sufficient to supply 
bread! – Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Declarations of 
Rights (Simpkin, Marshall, & Co., 1843) 501. 
14  Ellickson, above n 10, 12. Robert Ellickson defines ‘norm entrepreneurs’ as people in a group 
with ‘superior technical intelligence, social intelligence, and leadership skills’. He adapts the 
term from Cass Sunstein, who defines them more generally as ‘people interested in changing 
social norms’: ‘Social Norms and Social Roles’ (1996) 96(4) Columbia Law Review 909. 
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acting, and eventually the group converges on a particular norm, or equilibrium, which 
no individual had the power to impose. 
 
 Thor 
  Carry Bury Burn 
Odin 
Carry 25,30 20,15 5,10 
Bury 10,5 35,30 10,10 
Burn 5,5 15,10 20,25 
 
Why does convergence on a norm produce net benefits? In this case, assume that 
each member of the group understands the problem and is willing to follow a rule. 
Each is made better off by following one rule because it saves time, creates social 
harmony, and possibly brings economies of scale, such as one big pit where animal 
carcasses are burned or buried, or one spot in the woods along a clearly marked path 
where carcasses are dumped. Transaction costs are reduced and social costs are 
minimized by converging on a single method of disposal. 
Different methods of disposal may well be preferred by different people – 
perhaps because they are used to doing things a certain way, because they prefer 
digging holes to lighting fires, or because some people live close to the proposed burial 
ground or fire pit and have to endure the extra noise or odor that comes with living 
near a disposal site. In this case, as in many real world examples, the equilibrium that 
emerges may not be socially optimal, and none of the equilibria will satisfy everyone 
equally. But once a norm emerges as an equilibrium of the game, it becomes a self-
enforcing convention.15 The stability of norms in cases like this leads Eric Posner to 
say, somewhat reductively, that a ‘social norm is just the label we attach to equilibrium 
behavior’.16  
We think that Posner’s description is inadequate because it overlooks the 
distinctive normative force that attaches to some norms. Some equilibria just are 
emergent properties. But in such cases, should external conditions change, the 
equilibrium can change without any additional forces being invoked to restore the 
prevailing practice. What is characteristic of norms is that compliance is buttressed by 
additional incentives – by internal or external sanctions that reflect the norm’s status as 
a norm. Put another way, not all equilibria are sustained in the same way. Some are 
sustained solely by the objective payoffs – in our example, the reduced disease and 
more pleasant ambient aromas that are associated with carcass removal. Others are 
sustained (as well) by the fact that if you do not comply with the prevailing practice, 
you will be the object of contempt, and perhaps risk more material punishments, like 
being excluded from agreeable social activities (including, possibly, exchange of 
goods). The issue in explaining norms is not whether norm-governed behaviour 
constitutes an equilibrium, but rather what the equilibrating forces are. Not all social 
equilibria involve norms, and not all norms are social equilibria.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  See Thomas Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehaviour (W. W. Norton & Co, 2006) ch 3. 
16  Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms (Harvard University Press, 2002) 58. 
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The point is important because it bears on the question of how norms can 
transform collective action problems into coordination games with salient equilibria. 
The most general answers are through external sanctions like punishment, on the one 
hand, and through internal sanctions like guilt and shame, on the other. Shame occurs 
when an individual believes he has violated a social norm that others are in a position 
to detect, and believes others will disapprove of him as a result. Guilt occurs when an 
individual has internalized a social norm, believes he has violated it, and imposes a 
kind of internal sanction on himself as punishment for doing what he believes is unfair, 
immoral, or otherwise wrong, even when he knows nobody else knows about it. 
External sanctions are costly in time and resources,17 and in some situations guilt and 
shame will achieve the same result at lower cost. Indeed, it is plausible to suppose that 
moral emotions like guilt and shame may have evolved to minimize conflict among 
members of close-knit groups.18  
Since there is often a conflict between individual and group interests, different 
individuals are likely to experience different levels of guilt and shame for the same 
transgression, and it may be that threats of external sanctions are necessary to nudge 
many people to comply with norms. In political societies, sanctions can take the form 
of fines, prison sentences, and property seizures. But political sanctions are expensive 
to enforce, and even when legal rules are clear, people often turn to social norms to 
solve day to day disputes when the combination of internal sanctions like guilt and 
shame and external but informal sanctions like social stigma are sufficient to 
incentivize people to act in socially beneficial ways.19  
Social sanctions for violating norms often involve stigma, or diminished social 
standing, and this can mean fewer opportunities to trade, reduced access to mates or 
food, less security and protection from other members of a group, and (in extreme 
cases) threats of physical harm. But if, as Adam Smith thought, the desire for the good 
opinion of others is hard-wired into our psychological makeup, then individuals will be 
led to seek other people’s esteem even when there are no further consequences. So in 
cases where guilt is insufficient to coax individuals to comply with norms, social 
sanctions are important, and these need involve nothing more than the knowledge that 
observers disapprove of those who violate norms, or approve of those who abide by 
them. No central authority is involved. Moreover, where the would-be violator is not 
anonymous, and thus capable of bearing a reputation, esteem incentives can be 
reinforced in a simple and familiar way: gossip.  
Gossip would seem like a waste of time and energy for the people who engage in 
it, since monitoring social infractions and sharing information are public goods. 
Gossipers incur the full costs of gathering and spreading information, but only get a 
fraction of the benefits, which are dispersed among the entire group. The fact that 
useful gossip is a public good seems to create a second-order collective action problem 
in which each has an incentive to listen but never to talk about instances of other 
people following or flouting socially useful norms. The problem seems insurmountable 
in the absence of material incentives. But it is not.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  There are individuals in every society who get positive enjoyment from inflicting losses on 
others. Norms enable such individuals to satisfy this desire without enduring guilt or shame in 
doing so: by directing their anti-social impulses to norm-violators, would-be ‘punishers’ are 
licensed to indulge their impulses. On this account, the significance of more formal procedures 
of the law lies in regularizing and managing anarchic punitive activity rather than in ensuring 
that incentives for norm compliance are adequate.  
18  Darwin vacillates between individual and group selection accounts of the evolution of guilt, 
shame, and embarrassment. See The Descent of Man (1871), and The Expression of Emotion in 
Man and Animals (1872).  
19  Robert Ellickson, Order without Law (Harvard University Press, 1994). 
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The second-order collective action problem is only intractable if we assume that 
people are purely self-interested, or that they don’t get intrinsic rewards from sharing 
information about other people’s social behaviour. But it is a familiar fact that most 
people enjoy gossip, are rewarded by the esteem of others for conveying socially 
useful gossip, and fear the disesteem that follows from being the subject of negative 
gossip, or from spreading false rumors.  
Richard McAdams explicitly connects gossip and esteem to explain how social 
norms are policed in the absence of formal government. ‘The conversation we call 
“gossip” is often experienced as a benefit, not a cost, and it usually consists of 
information about how others have deviated from ordinary behaviour’.20 The reasons 
for this psychological quirk are shrouded in our evolutionary history, though 
undoubtedly a plausible story can be told about how a propensity to take delight in 
gossip, along with our disposition to feel shame or guilt for violating social norms, 
would confer advantages to the members of small groups. Whatever the explanation, 
our desire for the esteem of others may provide the incentive to gather and reveal 
information about other people’s rule infractions, and to publicly conform to rules 
ourselves. This sends signals to others that we are disposed to cooperate, and it may 
bring accolades from people we respect. According to McAdams, ‘the desire for 
esteem makes it possible, though not inevitable, that the group will solve the second-
order collective action problem [of monitoring behaviour and spreading information 
about rule infractions]. The barrier to norm formation arises from the assumption that 
any sanction must be costly to impose. If one can costlessly impose a small loss on 
others by withholding esteem, or costlessly impose a small gain by granting esteem, 
there is no incentive to free ride’.21 
While we agree with the gist of this view, it is clearly an overstatement to 
conclude that the intrinsic rewards of gossip and the pursuit of esteem remove all 
incentives to free ride in all cases. Unless norms are fully internalized and guilt is 
robust, shrewd social climbers might still break social norms in private, and people 
who are less concerned with the esteem of others might still free ride by failing to 
respond to gossip about them, or failing to spread socially beneficial gossip. This is 
especially true if the norm is widely viewed as outdated or unimportant, or if the 
person tempted to violate the norm has an attenuated sense of guilt and shame, or a low 
discount rate, perhaps because the costs of leaving the group or the benefits of future 
cooperation are low.  
So far we have focused on how social norms can arise as emergent orders in the 
absence of formal political institutions to transform collective action problems into 
simple coordination games with clear equilibria. Norms make certain equilibria salient. 
But some equilibria are better than others. 
Destructive norms, including those that began as constructive, or those that are 
constructive for some groups and destructive for others, can create norm traps that 
make nearly everyone worse off. For example, many have speculated that traditional 
religious rules, including those that regulate dietary and sexual habits, may have had 
some advantages for group members by making it clear what kinds of sexual behaviour 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  McAdams, above n 9, 362. 
21  Ibid 364. This formulation may suggest that the suppliers of esteem and disesteem are 
withholding or granting esteem as a conscious activity designed to encourage the esteemed 
agents in norm compliance. We think that this is neither plausible nor necessary. In most cases, 
individual observers simply form their judgements spontaneously: observers think that the actor 
has behaved badly (or well). If the actor knows that the norm is in place and that the opinions of 
others will track his action, and he cares about the good opinion of others, he will be encouraged 
to comply. If you fail to wash your hands after using the public lavatory, many observers will 
think you are a dirty person. But their thinking this does not need to be motivated by a special 
concern about spreading disease.  
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are kosher, and which foods are best avoided. Adding divine threats of punishment for 
violations helps convince group members who do not feel sufficient guilt or shame to 
comply for more self-interested reasons. But some of these rules, including 
prohibitions against homosexuality and consuming shellfish or animals with cloven 
hooves (both of which are forbidden in traditional Judaism), seem obsolete. Although 
these dietary rules may have initially helped group members avoid parasitic diseases 
like trichinosis (from pigs) or Salmonella (from oysters), they no longer seem to 
promote the welfare of anyone other than pigs and oysters.22  
Other norms that are arguably destructive have more sinister origins. For 
example, Gerry Mackie traces the evolution of footbinding in China and female genital 
mutilation (FGM) in many African countries, and finds that these practices originated 
not to serve the interests of most members of the group but to ensure that imperial 
female slaves would remain faithful to their masters. Broken feet make it difficult for 
women to seek sexual adventures, and mutilated sex organs make it less appealing, so 
these are two different solutions to the same problem: keeping women close to home, 
and ensuring that any children they foster are from the male king, or as the practice 
spread, the male head of household. Mackie suggests that we need only make three 
plausible assumptions to support the view that footbinding and FGM could arise and 
persist as stable equilibria even in a society in which they harm almost everyone: that 
people are strategically rational, that they desire to raise their own biological children 
(for men there is always some uncertainty about paternity), and that there is an original 
condition of female slavery or extreme subservience.23  
Once the convention takes hold, people will disapprove of those who do not 
practice it. In some countries religious leaders attach divine approval to the practice so 
that people who do not experience enough guilt or shame for not complying may also 
experience the fear of divine punishment, in addition to the prospect of being less 
desirable in the marriage market. Thus, even those who oppose these practices may 
have reasons to mutilate their daughters in order to make them attractive to suitors. 
Parents are caught in ‘belief traps’ and the entire society is caught in a ‘norm trap’. 
Posner and Rasmusen define a ‘norm trap’ as a situation in which ‘the transitional 
costs to a new norm are high enough [that] society is stuck with a suboptimal norm’.24 
The cost of transition is especially high if women who resist these practices are less 
likely to get married, and bear and raise as many offspring as those who follow them. 
Even if some rebellious women can overcome the guilt, shame, and social stigma 
associated with violating the norm that requires her to bind her daughter’s feet or cut 
off her clitoris, their daughters are likely to leave fewer descendants, and therefore fail 
to undermine the norm over the long run. This helps explain why footbinding persisted 
for 1,000 years in China, and FGM still flourishes in parts of Africa and the Middle 
East. 
 We will defer discussion about how to respond to destructive norms like these 
until the final section. The upshot of this section is that whether norms are constructive 
or destructive, they are usually best thought of as emergent properties, according to 
which the independent actions of people in a group combine to produce a macro-
pattern that may not be the intended or preferred outcome of anyone in the group. 
Hayek saw such emergent patterns as a pervasive and important feature of social life:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  Of course people who avoid these foods now do it for explicitly religious reasons, not for any 
health benefits. But we suggest that the origin of many such rules lies in the (perceived) benefits 
they once conferred to the groups of people who adopted them. 
23  Gerry Mackie, ‘Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account’ (1996) 61 
American Sociological Review 1010. 
24  Richard A Posner and Eric B Rasmusen, ‘Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special 
Reference to Sanctions’ (1999) 19 International Review of Law and Economics 378 
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We understand one another and get along with one another, are able to act successfully 
on our plans, because, most of the time, members of our civilization conform to 
unconscious patterns of conduct, show a regularity in their actions that is not the result 
of commands or coercion, often not even of any conscious adherence to known rules, 
but of firmly established habits and traditions. The general observance of these 
conventions is a necessary condition of the orderliness of the world in which we live, 
of our being able to find our way in it, though we do not know their significance and 
may not even be consciously aware of their existence.25 
 
II   EMERGENT ORDERS AND INVISIBLE HANDS 
 
What is the relationship between emergent orders and invisible hands? Both are 
similar ways of explaining social phenomena, and on some views, they are identical. 
But we think they are worth distinguishing in the following way. Emergent orders are 
neutral with respect to human welfare, while invisible hand processes are emergent 
orders that serve to promote human welfare. In other words, invisible hands are one 
kind of emergent order.  
This distinction is consistent, we think, with Adam Smith’s usage. Although 
Smith used ‘invisible hand’ three times in his writings, only two of the occurrences 
seem to indicate an important economic insight. Smith’s first use of the phrase 
‘invisible hand’ is completely unrelated to the second two. In his History of Astronomy 
Smith complained that whenever Greek and Roman polytheists observed unusual 
events, they naively saw ‘the invisible hand of Jupiter’ behind them.26 In the two other 
occurrences of the phrase in his writings, Smith clearly has in mind a process in which 
the actions of independent agents, each with their own parochial goals, inadvertently 
produce a socially beneficial outcome. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith says:  
 
The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. They consume 
little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though 
they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from 
the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own 
vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their 
improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution 
of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided 
into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without 
knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication 
of the species.27 
 
In the Wealth of Nations Smith says:  
 
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he [the capitalist] 
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its 
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as 
in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of 
his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  Hayek above n 7, 123. Cristina Bicchieri agrees, in a passage paraphrasing Adam Ferguson: 
‘[m]any social norms are not the outcome of a plan or a conscious design to enact them; they 
emerge by human action but not by human design’: Bicchieri, above n 11, 40. 
26  Here is the relevant passage: ‘it may be observed, that in all polytheistic religions, among 
savages, and in the early ages of heathen antiquity, it is the irregular events of nature only that 
are ascribed to the agency and power of their gods. Fire burns, and water refreshes; heavy bodies 
descend, and lighter substances fly upwards, by the necessity of their own natures; nor was the 
invisible hand of Jupiter ever apprehended to be employed in those matters’. Adam Smith, 
History of Astronomy (1995) §3, para 2.  
27  1759 Book 4, chapter 1, section 10. 
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pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually 
than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by 
those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very 
common among merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them 
from it.28 
  
Although the invisible hand metaphor is seen by scholars as one of his greatest 
insights, Smith does not formally develop the idea. On our account, an invisible hand 
process must exhibit the following five features:  
 
1. The process gives rise to an identifiable pattern.  
2. That pattern emerges through the actions of independent agents. 
3. The pattern is one that most participants do not intend to produce. 
4. The pattern provides net benefits to the group that (inadvertently) produces it, 
or has attractive normative properties in some other sense.29 
5. The pattern is surprising, unforeseen, or unpredictable by those who produce 
it. 
 
We shall consider each of these in turn, and then say when norms can be 
construed as arising by an invisible hand process.  
 
A   Patterns 
 
Since some of what we call patterns are merely reifications, or projections onto an 
indifferent universe – like the constellations in the stars or the man in the moon – we 
might wish to exclude merely apparent patterns as invisible hand phenomena. But 
perhaps we should be ecumenical about what count as patterns. All we mean by 
‘patterns’ is the existence of a discernible regularity or structure. Notice that many 
structures are of no scientific significance but may appear to some people to be 
significant in another way. When a devout religious believer observes that a passing 
cloud looks like a famous prophet, an impartial observer will say that although it looks 
like a prophet because of the pattern of water molecules, it is not in fact a prophet. We 
can agree that the water molecules that comprise the cloud do exhibit a structure which 
resembles a prophet’s face, but disagree on whether this matters. This case suggests 
that what constitutes a pattern is in part a scientific question, but also a question of 
what kinds of facts people think are important to explain and in what terms such 
explanations run. In the case of human welfare, the invisible hand explanation in the 
market case is an attempt to show how something that nearly everyone should care 
about comes to pass: how individuals acting for their own ends can, under the right 
conditions, increase the welfare of others by engaging in mutually advantageous 
specialization and trade. The pattern is the aggregate effect, and the explanation is a set 
of conjectures about the incentives created by opportunities for trade. 
 
B   Independent agents 
 
Invisible hand processes always involve independent agents acting in accordance with 
their own preferences, beliefs, and goals. This is not to say people’s goals do not 
impact other people, but only that each agent is acting for her own reasons, and under 
no duress or coercion. In Smith’s first invisible hand example, the rich are said to care 
about nothing but getting cheap labor from the poor whom they employ, but in doing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  1776 Book 4, chapter 2, section 9.  
29  As in Smith’s example where the good feature produced is a more equal distribution of 
‘necessaries’. 
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so poor labourers who perceive the job as their best option, end up better off than they 
would have been in the absence of the selfish employer offering them the job. It is 
worth stressing that Smith does not think workers and employers are usually 
exclusively self-interested. The idea is that even under this cynical assumption, we 
may still get a better allocation of resources if people develop their skills and produce 
things that other people want in order to increase their own profits, than we would if 
they devoted their days to acts of charity.  
 
C   Without intention 
 
It is important, we think, to stress that some people might intend to improve social 
welfare when they act in the marketplace, but Smith’s point is that patterns like social 
welfare improvements need not be intended in order for that general improvement to 
materialize. Thus, to count as an invisible hand process, we do not need to make the 
extreme claim that nobody intends a particular outcome that results from independent 
choices; we only need to assume that nobody needs to intend it in order to bring it 
about. For example, it is conceivable that some Chinese families bound their 
daughter’s feet not simply because it made her more attractive in the marriage market 
in 18th century China, but because they thought this is a pattern worth preserving. Of 
course, no individual has the power to preserve or destroy such a ubiquitous social 
norm. But it is perfectly possible to say the norm arose or persisted without most 
people, and in some cases all people, intending to promote the norm. 
 
D   Socially beneficial 
 
In both occurrences of ‘invisible hand’ in the works of Adam Smith, there is a strong 
implication that for a process to count as an invisible hand, it must bring benefits to the 
people to whom it applies. Some disagree with this usage. For example, Robert Nozick 
argues that ‘not every pattern that arises by an invisible-hand process is desirable’.30 
We think this matter of word usage is essentially a question of taste. The advantage of 
Nozick’s definition is that it covers cases throughout the natural world, like Hume’s 
account of the evolution of the universe from a few simple laws, or the popular view 
among biologists that mitochondria began as parasites and eventually became 
indispensable sources of power to virtually all organisms. But we stick with the usage 
traditional in economics. When all of the conditions other than (4) are present, and 
when the outcome is unequivocally bad rather than neutral or good, economists 
sometimes refer to the ‘backside of the invisible hand’ or what we call the ‘invisible 
fist’. Thus, the ozone hole that developed in the 1980s from the unregulated use of 
chlorofluorocarbons is a paradigm case of the invisible fist: nobody who used hair 
spray products in California intended to raise the risk of skin cancer in Queensland by 
depleting part of the atmosphere, but this was the result.  
 
E   Surprising 
 
Adam Smith suggests, and many commentators agree,31 that invisible hand 
explanations are in some sense surprising. Like our third criterion, this needs to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30  Robert Nozick, ‘Invisible-Hand Explanations’ (1994) 84(2) The American Economic Review 
315. 
31  See Edna Ullmann-Margalit, ‘Invisible-Hand Explanations’ (1978) 39 Synthese 271; Gerald 
Gaus, ‘Explanation, Justification, and Emergent Properties: An Essay on Nozickian Metatheory’ 
in The Cambridge Companion to Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012); Adrian Vermeule, ‘The Invisible Hand in Legal and Political Theory’ (2010) 96(6) 
Virginia Law Review 1422. 
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qualified. Invisible hands need not actually surprise everyone, especially social 
scientists and curious people who enjoy discovering basic principles that explain how 
the world works. Indeed, although invisible hand explanations are typically surprising 
to those who first encounter them, they become expected by experts who study them in 
particular domains. Once we have an explanation for how invisible hands work, we get 
a deeply satisfying theory, one which generates predictions that are ultimately 
unsurprising. 
When these conditions are present, the invisible hand metaphor is apt because, as 
Brennan and Pettit argue, ‘those who remain mere participants in the system, those 
who fail to adopt a theoretical stance on what happens, will necessarily fail to 
recognize what is going on … Participants who are not also theorists are embedded in 
their individual positions, and are aware of the immediate pushes and pulls that work 
on them; but they lack any sense of the aggregate shape of things.’32 
Many have argued that evolution by natural (and sexual) selection can be thought 
of as an invisible hand process. Leda Cosmides and John Tooby join Robert Nozick 
and Friedrich Hayek in describing evolution this way, mainly because it blindly 
produces what appear to be designed creatures.33 The historical and conceptual link 
between theories of emergent order in biology and economics is profound. As Hayek 
reminds us, ‘The theory of evolution of traditions and habits which made the 
formations of spontaneous orders possible stands … in a close relation to the theory of 
evolution of particular kinds of spontaneous orders which we call organisms, and has 
in fact provided the essential concepts on which the latter was built’.34  
However, on our view there is an important difference between emergent orders 
and invisible hands, one that is occasionally obscured by the ambiguity of terms like 
‘fitness’ and ‘success’ in evolutionary theory. The difference is that evolution does not 
necessarily produce favourable outcomes according to any widely agreed upon 
normative benchmark. There are two aspects to this observation. One is resistance to 
the idea of evolution as progress: there is simply no reason to think that dinosaurs 
were, in their evolutionary context, in any way ‘inferior’ to prevalent species in our 
own context. And what the participants make of the evolutionary processes to which 
they are subject can make no difference to how those processes work. Evolution 
simply operates as a blind filter. The other aspect involves recognizing that natural 
selection is a process that adapts organisms to particular environments, not one that 
makes them happy or successful in any sense other than differential numbers of 
surviving offspring.  
Consider Darwin’s discussion of natural selection (a phrase which suggests an 
invisible hand that selects winners and losers), in which he compares the intentional 
selection of animal farmers with the unintentional selection of nature:  
 
As man can produce and certainly has produced a great result by his methodical and 
unconscious means of selection, what may not nature effect? Man can act only on 
external and visible characteristics: nature cares nothing for appearances, except 
insofar as they may be useful to any being. She can act on every internal organ, on 
every shade of constitutional difference, on the whole machinery of life. Man selects 
only for his own good; Nature only for that of the being which she tends … 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit, ‘Hands Invisible and Intangible’ (1993) 94 Synthese 200. 
33  Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, ‘Better than Rational: Evolutionary Psychology and the 
Invisible Hand’ (1994) 84(2) American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 327. An 
accessible account of evolution by natural selection as an invisible hand process is Richard 
Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (W W Norton & Co, 1986). 
34  Friedrich Hayek, ‘The Results of Human Action but not of Human Design’ (1980) Studies in 
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics 101. 
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[Man] does not allow the most vigorous males to struggle for the females. He does not 
rigidly destroy all inferior animals, but protects during each varying season, as far as 
lies in his power, all his productions. He often begins his selection by some half-
monstrous form; or at least by some modification prominent enough to catch his eye, 
or to be plainly useful to him. Under nature, the slightest difference or structure or 
constitution may well turn the nicely-balanced scale in the struggle for life, and so be 
preserved. How fleeting are the wishes and efforts of man! how short his time! and 
consequently how poor will his products be, compared with those accumulated by 
nature during whole geological periods. Can we wonder, then, that nature’s 
productions should be far ‘truer’ in character than man’s productions; that they should 
be infinitely better adapted to the most complex conditions of life, and should plainly 
bear the stamp of far higher workmanship?35  
 
Darwin anthropomorphizes Nature throughout the metaphor, and appeals to our 
tendency to explain the appearance of patterns by intentional action. Darwin is, 
ironically, using what Daniel Dennett calls the ‘design stance’ to destroy the argument 
from design. But his language may suggest to the careless reader that he thinks the 
organisms that emerge from the evolutionary process are better in some sense than the 
‘inferior’ creatures farmers produce through deliberate selection. This interpretation is 
a mistake. By ‘inferior’ creatures Darwin simply means those that are less well-
adapted to their environment, not creatures that are less happy, or well off.36   
Since fitness is just a measure of reproductive success, not social welfare, 
Darwin’s argument suggests that the products of evolution by natural selection are 
emergent orders but not necessarily invisible hand processes (as we use the terms). 
Still, some emergent orders that arise through evolution can be described as invisible 
hands, since they make us better off according to widely accepted normative standards. 
For example, human intelligence and compassion have arisen through a 
combination of natural selection, sexual selection, and gene-culture coevolution. If 
general intelligence is a trait that is both individually beneficial and widely valued 
because of its social consequences,37 and if compassion and kindness are attractive 
traits to both men and women, then socially beneficial consequences can result from 
the process of mate selection in which such consequences are neither foreseen nor 
intended.  
By contrast, dysgenic processes in which individual choices lead to socially 
undesirable outcomes are the back side of the invisible hand, or the invisible fist. If, as 
some have argued, wealth, education, and IQ are negatively correlated with fertility 
(the number of children people choose to have), the growth of wealth and welfare in 
the modern world may inadvertently produce dysgenic effects even if each person 
would prefer an aggregate outcome in which future people are at least as intelligent as 
current people.38 As Thomas Schelling put it, ‘marriage and romance are exceedingly 
individual and private activities, but their genetic consequences are altogether 
aggregate’.39 
So far we have described invisible hand processes as emergent orders that 
promote human welfare. This implies that norms constitute invisible hands when they 
are welfare-promoting emergent orders. How might they do this? One example is 
Robert Ellickson’s argument that, over time, norms in close-knit communities tend to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35  The Origin of Species (Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003) 76-77. 
36  And since the environment of farm animals involves farmers who are cultivating the species for 
its capacity to produce food other people want to consume, it seems clear that farm animals are 
evolving to fit their actual environment better than the variants which are bred out. 
37  Nicholas Mackintosh, IQ and Human Intelligence (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
38  For an overview of the evidence and some possible responses to the problem, see Jonny 
Anomaly, ‘Public Goods and Procreation’ Monash Bioethics Review (forthcoming).  
39  Schelling, above n 15, 140. 
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evolve in ways that maximize the efficient use of scarce resources.40 In a famous case 
study, Ellickson examined how cattle ranchers in Shasta, California settle disputes 
involving cattle straying from one farm to another and inflicting damage on 
neighboring property. What he found is that farmers tend to rely on informal rules that 
are enforced through social rather than legal sanctions. Even when laws were passed, 
he observed that ranchers either deliberately ignored them or were ignorant of their 
existence. Among the reasons he gives for this are: the cost of taking legal action 
(transaction costs and monetary costs); that laws may be less efficient solutions than 
norms that emerged from a trial-and-error process; and the fact that norms created 
within a community tend to have more perceived authority over those who live there 
than externally imposed laws.  
 
One reason people are frequently willing to ignore law is that they often possess more 
expeditious means for achieving order. For example, neighbors in rural Shasta County 
are sufficiently close-knit to generate and enforce informal social norms to govern 
minor irritations such as cattle-trespass and boundary-fence disputes. This close-
knittedness enables victims of social transgressions to discipline deviants by means of 
simple self-help measures such as negative gossip and mild physical reprisals. Under 
these circumstances, informal social controls are likely to supplant law.41 
 
Ellickson takes the argument further and suggests that laws passed by legislatures 
can undermine socially beneficial norms, and that ‘lawmakers who are unappreciative 
of the social conditions that foster informal cooperation are likely to create a world in 
which there is both more law and less order’.42  
We do not wish to defend the more optimistic part of Ellickson’s thesis – the idea 
that social norms tend to be efficient in close-knit groups. In fact, we find Ellickson’s 
general claim implausible if it is taken to imply that we should generally defer to 
norms rather than laws. People can become ensnared in local rather than global optima; 
some groups can maintain destructive norms for long periods of time; most norms 
emerge locally with their path-dependent properties tracking local conditions and seem 
unlikely to be sufficiently sticky to bind together the millions of independent actors in 
modern nation states. Instead, we take Ellickson’s case study to illustrate the 
importance of understanding norms as emergent orders, and of separating socially 
beneficial emergent orders (invisible hands) from socially destructive emergent orders 
(invisible fists).  
It is, we think, useful to distinguish between processes that emerge invisibly and 
processes where outcomes are sustained invisibly.43 When Adam Smith describes the 
market order and the highly beneficial division of labor to which it gives rise, he talks 
both of how that order arose in the first place – as the ‘very slow and gradual 
consequence’ of a possibly ‘original principle in human nature’ – and of how the 
equilibria in that emergent order are preserved. Participants in markets typically have 
no regard to the normative properties of the equilibrium prices and quantities that 
emerge from competitive market processes; each simply does the best she can for 
herself.  
To see the distinction at stake here, consider another familiar process – that of 
electoral competition under broadly democratic processes. The requirement to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  By ‘efficient’ Ellickson has in mind Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, according to which norms tend to 
maximize net social welfare even if they result in losses for some members of the group, 
especially in the short run. Ellickson’s thesis resembles Posner’s conjecture that the common law 
tends toward efficiency. 
41  Ellickson, above n 19, 282. 
42  Ibid 286. 
43  This distinction is made by Ullman-Margalit, above n 31. 
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elected provides incentives for candidates or contending parties to formulate policies 
that are believed to be attractive to voters (or strategic groups of them) even if the 
candidates themselves are motivated predominantly by a desire to further their own 
political careers. There can be a substantial mismatch between the motives of political 
agents and the normative justification for the ultimate outcomes. We might then refer 
to democracy as constituting an invisible hand process, at least in part. But that 
description – and the question of how well the incentive structure imposed by electoral 
competition works to produce outcomes that track voter interests – is perfectly 
consistent with democratic institutions being designed and chosen ‘visibly’. Shrewd 
and well-motivated ‘founding fathers’ may have designed the institutions under which 
in-period politics operates specifically with an eye to those institutions’ normative 
properties: but at the in-period level, ambitious political candidates and ordinary voters 
may be operating with much more self-interested considerations predominant. In that 
sense, constitutional democracy did not emerge invisibly; but it may operate invisibly. 
 
III   NORMS AND LAWS, LIBERTY AND WELFARE 
 
The main difference between laws and norms, as we understand them, is that laws 
can be enforced by a central government that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force, whereas norms are created and enforced with informal social sanctions. This 
makes it more plausible to describe norms as emergent orders since they typically arise 
in situations in which no one in a group has the power to unilaterally impose rules on 
everyone else in the group. 
But laws can also be thought of as emergent orders of a certain kind, especially in 
representative governments. Public choice theorists often describe laws as the 
byproducts of actions lawmakers perform in order to win elections. Laws are, to a large 
extent, constrained by the wishes of citizens, the incentives created by political 
institutions, and the prospect for politicians of electoral success or failure. Some laws 
are simply a codification of widely accepted norms – for example, against murder, 
theft, and unprovoked violence; and other laws emerge from the decisions of judges. 
Judges often defer to precedent, and to widely shared norms. This suggests that any 
particular law in a representative government is shaped by the actions of many 
different people, with their own individual preferences. But because the state has the 
power to create and enforce its laws as a singular entity, we think it is worth retaining 
the (typically exaggerated) conceptual distinction between norms as emergent orders 
and laws as externally imposed directives.44   
Norm optimists (like Elinor Ostrom and Robert Ellickson) tend to think we 
should give more scope to markets rather than politics, so that groups of people can be 
left free to develop efficient solutions to local problems. Norm pessimists (like Eric 
Posner and Richard McAdams) tend to emphasize nasty norms that become entrenched 
in cultures that would be better off without them: they think laws are often a more 
effective way to enhance social welfare, individual liberty, and other widely shared 
values. Like the distinction between bottom-up norms and top-down laws, the 
distinction between optimists and pessimists is a bit overblown. After all, norm 
optimists recognize that the populations of modern states are often too big and diverse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  Moreover, laws themselves operate within a highly structured network of norms – ones that run 
from the professional norms of judges and lawyers and police to the norms of the general 
community that allow government to have its ‘monopoly on the legitimate use of force’ in the 
first place. When the term ‘legitimate’ is used here, it refers not so much to what the law says 
about what officers can do, but to what those subject to the laws will let them do. In well-ordered 
political societies many people seem to obey the law because it is the law: they assign to the law 
a certain normative authority. They treat the police as entitled to be obeyed and treat court 
procedures as entitled to settle disputes.  
276




for norms to solve large scale collective action problems, and norm pessimists 
recognize that political solutions have their own problems. According to Ellickson, 
‘the key difference between [norm optimists and pessimists] appears to be that the 
optimists have less confidence than the pessimists that government can outperform 
social forces in reforming inefficient norms’.45 
We are neither optimistic nor pessimistic about norms. Instead, we argue that 
scholars and legislators in representative governments should consider the following 
questions when thinking about whether to rely more heavily on laws or norms, or 
harness the power of law to indirectly encourage or discourage the evolution of norms.  
 
A   How urgent and widespread is the problem? 
 
Scholars from Elinor Ostrom to Robert Ellickson have argued that members of a 
community engaged in repeat interactions will usually find an informal arrangement 
for solving problems that arise with alternative uses of natural resources. Among the 
usual provisos are that the relevant actors must have a sufficiently low discount rate to 
justify cooperation, and that social sanctions attached to norm violations must be 
strong enough to induce compliance.  
However, many of the evolutionary views shared by norm optimists rely on a 
lengthy trial-and-error process during which different norms are tried out until the 
group converges on a mutually beneficial equilibrium. But when a challenge that 
requires collective action stems from an imminent threat to a large and diverse group, 
social norms may not emerge in time to solve the problem. This can be true for the 
spread of an infectious disease like SARS in China in the 1990s, or the sudden collapse 
of a population of animals like the American Bald Eagle in the mid-20th century. While 
social norms can help preserve an endangered species or reduce the threat of an 
infectious disease, they are typically not as effective as state-sponsored efforts in 
representative governments whose leaders have the power to coerce, and to impose 
uniform rules with credible sanctions. This is not to say that states should spend any 
amount of money to save an endangered species or control an infectious disease, only 
that social evolution may be too slow a process to rely on for urgent collective action 
problems. 
 
B   Are there inter-group or inter-generational externalities? 
 
Externalities are a pervasive part of social life. But not all externalities matter 
from a moral standpoint, and some negative externalities are more efficiently 
addressed through social norms rather than legal requirements. As a rule of thumb, 
Adrian Vermeule suggests that ‘norms are most plausibly efficient within close-knit 
groups of repeat interactors who collectively bear both the costs and benefits of the 
norms they create, so that the group’s internal norms do not impose significant 
externalities. Yet such groups are the exception rather than the rule in large scale 
modern economies.’46 For this reason, two kinds of inter-group externalities might 
merit legal intervention rather than reliance on norms to achieve welfare 
improvements. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45  Ellickson, above n 10, 36. Like Ostrom and Ellickson, Hayek’s view is not grounded in 
reverence for authority or tradition, but stems from the belief that, at least much of the time, 
social norms survive because they solve problems that we fail to understand, and which we lack 
the ability to solve by relying on experts who may be over-confident in their own wisdom: ‘Far 
from assuming that those who created the institutions were wiser than we are, the evolutionary 
view is based on the insight that the result of experimentation of many generations may embody 
more experience than any one man may possess’: Hayek, above n 7, 122. 
46  Vermeule, above n 31, 1438. 
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First, when a set of norms benefits one group at the expense of another, the norms 
may be worth altering or supplanting with legal requirements or prohibitions. For 
example, if one group of people that lives upstream from another catches all of the 
desirable fish from the river and then floods the river with human waste, the result may 
be unfair for the group that lives downstream, and socially inefficient when 
considering the aggregate welfare of both groups. Yet the norms may constitute a 
social optimum for the upstream group.  
Second, when a group’s norms impose significant negative externalities on future 
people, there may be reason to use legal mandates to reduce these harms. Obvious 
cases include current people using scarce resources in a way that maximally benefits 
themselves at the expense of future people. Anthropogenic climate change, the 
evolution of antibiotic resistant bacteria, and species extinction are all cases in which 
current action can threaten future people in ways that may be nearly impossible for 
social norms alone to solve. We do not mean to suggest that all negative externalities 
should be eliminated, since they may be part of a process which has compensating 
benefits. Instead, we suggest that when current practices impose net negative 
externalities on future people norms are often insufficient to solve the problem. 
This is partly a function of numbers. When a public good like the preservation of 
an endangered species or an effective antibiotic requires the coordination of a large and 
diverse number of people, most people will lack the incentive to make the relevant 
sacrifices, even if a norm requires them to do so. One reason is the free rider problem, 
which occurs when each person has an incentive to indulge in a socially costly activity 
that he would prefer everyone not to engage in. Another is the assurance problem, 
which occurs when people are willing to sacrifice to produce an outcome that is good 
for current or future people, but lack the assurance that enough others will sacrifice to 
make their effort worthwhile. For example, in some circles social norms require us to 
spend more money to buy a fuel efficient car or an energy efficient light bulb. Many of 
us happily comply with such norms, but most people either lack the money or the 
desire to do so under conditions in which the benefits of conservation are socialized 
but the costs are internalized. By prohibiting or taxing socially costly activities, laws 
can, in principle, help us converge on a salient equilibrium that is both fair and 
efficient – across groups, and generations. 
This is not to say that efficiency is all that matters. Far from it, values like liberty 
and autonomy should also be considered when thinking about when to rely on 
emergent norms or formal laws. And the claim that government action can give rise to 
fair and efficient equilibria does not show that government action will have that effect.  
 
C   Do existing norms threaten liberties that are important for human autonomy? 
 
When there is a trade-off between individual liberty and social welfare, or when 
liberty is not sufficiently respected by communal norms, the state might intervene with 
privacy laws, or more generally, constitutional guarantees like the American Bill of 
Rights. We should distinguish two cases of norms that might interfere with important 
kinds of liberties: nosy norms, and norms that encourage us to pursue positional goods. 
 
1   Nosy Norms 
 
As social creatures, we often have strong opinions about how other people live 
their lives. This can be beneficial, as when parents and teachers encourage children to 
develop habits that are likely to benefit them later on but which they fail to understand 
now. But this disposition has a dark side. For example, growing up in a religious 
community may provide social benefits, psychological security, and even material 
278




welfare, especially for the poor and disabled. But it can also be oppressive for deviants 
who are treated with suspicion and hostility.  
Coming out as an atheist or homosexual can be personally liberating, but nearly 
impossible if the predictable social sanctions are severe. Among the sanctions may be 
foregone job opportunities, public humiliation by former friends and family, and even 
ostracism and informal punishment by religious authorities (for example, long before 
Saudi Arabia made it a capital crime to consume alcohol or convert to Christianity, 
clerics harshly enforced religious traditions, or norms, that prohibited such activities). 
Even if abstaining from alcohol or conforming to a set of religious requirements makes 
a community function more efficiently, at least in the short run, these norms are 
obviously oppressive to some community members.  
Autonomy can be enhanced in cases like this through constitutional protections of 
religious and sexual minorities, or statutes that grant religious freedom and remove the 
state’s ability to choose which set of religious traditions it wishes to support. Less 
direct ways of undermining norms that are corrosive to autonomy is to create privacy 
laws that make it illegal for citizens, employers, clerics, and other authority figures to 
access or spread certain kinds of information about people. Even in the absence of 
religious toleration, privacy laws can make it harder for the conformists to deprive 
dissenters of important social and economic opportunities.47   
 
2   Positional Goods 
 
Some norms solidify rather than solve collective action problems. In particular, 
some norms lead us to act in ways that are individually beneficial, given the actions of 
other people, but socially harmful. Positional goods are a clear case in which other 
people’s actions, and expectations, can make all of us worse off. For example, since 
people around the world find youthful appearance attractive,48 many spend time and 
money wearing makeup and high heels, using expensive hair dyes and skin creams, 
whitening teeth, and removing wrinkles with risky and costly cosmetic surgeries.  
To be sure, social norms sometimes solve collective action problems associated 
with positional goods. For example, counter-culture hippies in 1960s San Francisco 
wore unkempt beards and long hair, and rejected makeup and designer clothes in order 
to distinguish themselves from what they saw as the materialism of mid-twentieth 
century Americans. But cases like this are rare and transitory, so perhaps socially 
destructive norms should be taxed or banned. Some scholars emphasize the ubiquity of 
positional goods, and support using laws that raise the cost of positional goods.49 We 
do not disagree with this, in principle, but it is worth emphasizing that government 
intervention can make the problem worse. First, laws require resources to enforce, and 
enforcing laws against high heels and makeup, for example, might be both expensive 
and ineffective if people turn to black markets and homemade beauty products to 
satisfy their preferences. Unless the law carries serious penalties, it is likely to be 
ignored, and if it did carry serious penalties, it would create new harms by encouraging 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47  See McAdams, above n 9, 424. 
48  The evolutionary reason men are attracted to youthful appearance is that younger women are 
typically more fertile. The evolutionary reason women care less about youthful appearance is 
that men’s fertility does not decline quite as steeply with age, and because women – who spend 
more resources bearing and raising children – must be far more careful about who fathers their 
children. This makes them more likely to seek out signs of success more than fertility. Thus, 
men are usually under less pressure to chase the positional good of youthful appearance, though 
they may be under more pressure to chase the quasi-positional good of financial success. See 
Geoffrey Miller, The Mating Mind (Anchor, 1999).  
49  See especially Robert Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behaviour and the Quest for 
Status (Oxford University Press, 1987). 
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the usual maladies associated with black markets (assuming some inelasticity in the 
demand for cosmetics). Second, empowering law makers to decide which positional 
goods to ban or tax provides them with powers that we may prefer them not to have. 
Some argue that the pursuit of higher education is a positional good (and in some 
cases, they are right), but most of us do not think education should be taxed to avert 
educational arms races, in part because policymakers typically lack the information 
and incentives to distinguish socially valuable from socially harmful degree programs. 
 
D   Is the norm a local optimum when a global optimum is achievable at low cost? 
 
In strategic interactions with many participants and many equilibria, it is easy to 
understand how people can be caught in norm traps, or local optima, when other 
welfare-enhancing norms are available. We have already described norms surrounding 
pollution disposal, footbinding, and female genital mutilation, as impure coordination 
games with multiple equilibria. Another interesting norm is the social expectation 
(which became a legal requirement in some societies) that each man must pay a 
‘brideprice’ to the family of the woman whom he wishes to marry. This practice is so 
common that it was standard in most preindustrial societies, and persists in many parts 
of Africa today. The complementary practice that requires the family of women to pay 
a ‘dowry’ to the man’s family as a condition of marriage became increasingly 
prevalent in India during the 20th century.50  
Some have argued that the practice of brideprice is associated with a strong 
female role in agriculture, and that dowry is associated with societies in which women 
have a smaller role in labour-intensive agriculture.51 There also appears to be a 
correlation between brideprice and polygyny, and between dowry and monogamy. In 
societies that practice it, a brideprice is typically seen as the cost a husband pays to his 
wife’s family in exchange for her household labour, whereas dowry is often paid by a 
woman’s family to a man’s family in exchange for her opportunity to marry into a 
family of ‘superior’ social rank. More recently, in some societies, groomprices (direct 
cash payments to the groom rather than his family) have become prevalent ways for 
women to increase their social standing. The evolution of norms surrounding marriages 
may very well be efficient responses to local conditions, but in many cases they are 
local optima in an unfair game. This is true when they evolve against a backdrop in 
which women lack access to education or property.  
When we look at the game more globally, so to speak, we might argue that all of 
the local equilibria are inferior to an alternative equilibrium in another game. That 
other game is one in which women are given equal opportunities to own and inherit 
property, to seek education, and participate in the workforce. Under these conditions – 
conditions of more equal rights and bargaining power – women would not be forced by 
circumstance to seek men in higher social classes, or come up with enough money to 
pay a groom for increased life prospects. But these conditions, and the game itself, 
may benefit from legislation that ensures property rights and bodily autonomy for each 
individual, rather than letting norms evolve organically, or simply passing ad hoc laws 
that attempt to reduce the murder of brides whose family pays insufficient dowry, 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  Siwan Anderson, ‘The Economics of Dowry and Brideprice’ (2007) 21(4) The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 151. 
51  Ibid 156. 
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E   How quickly are destructive norms likely to change in the absence of state 
intervention?  
 
Impersonal laws are often better than norms when groups are large or diverse. But 
laws can also supplement norm change, and for many of the most troubling norms, the 
most effective state response may be to indirectly facilitate norm change.   
Consider again the case of footbinding in China and FGM in Africa. Gerry 
Mackie argues that although laws against footbinding probably had some effect in 
hastening the process of subverting the norm, the work of anti-footbinding societies 
was much more important. According to Mackie, these societies did three things:  
 
First, they carried out a modern education campaign, which explained that the 
rest of the world did not bind women’s feet – that China was losing face in the 
world and was subject to international ridicule. Second, their education 
campaign explained the advantages of natural feet and the disadvantages of 
bound feet. Third, they formed natural-foot societies, whose members pledged 
not to bind their daughters’ feet nor to let their sons marry women with bound 
feet.52 
 
If this is right, the best state action may be to simply allow norm entrepreneurs 
and public health practitioners to go to work. Outlawing the practice may send a signal 
of social disapproval to those who think the government is a source of moral authority, 
but it fails to address the underlying strategic problem unless it enforces legal 
prohibitions vigorously. 
The demise of footbinding as a social norm seems to have occurred in part 
because of information cascades, which altered the strategic considerations parents 
faced in deciding how to make their daughters attractive in the marriage market. 
According to Cristina Bicchieri, ‘informational cascades occur when it is optimal for 
an individual, having observed the actions of other individuals, to follow their behavior 
regardless of his own preferences or information’.53 Once parents understood the 
alternatives, all they needed was some assurance that enough other people around them 
would decline to bind their daughters’ feet. Anti-footbinding societies could make 
agreements credible in close-knit communities, even in the absence of state 
enforcement. As soon as enough parents complied with the new norm, the older and 
less socially efficient norm vanished. On Mackie’s view, similar societies are likely to 
be effective at ending FGM in African countries where legislation has had little effect. 
States can facilitate this process by allowing public health professionals to spread 
information, in addition to outlawing the practice, which has so far been 
unsuccessful.54 
 
F   What are the limits of the law? 
 
The evaluation of norms as instruments of social order should be posed as a 
comparative exercise. It is a familiar conceptual point – much emphasized by public 
choice theorists – that the mere observation that a norm is not working ‘optimally’ is 
not sufficient to justify legal intervention. The aphorism that, to a man with a hammer 
everything looks like a nail, is applicable here. Policymakers and lawmakers are 
perhaps inevitably psychologically disposed to think that policy and law are 
appropriate solutions to all observed problems. In other words, people in the business 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52  Mackie, above n 23, 1011. 
53  Bicchieri, above n 11, 197. 
54  Mackie, above n 23, 1014. 
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of law and policy tend to be blind to the limitation of their own tools.55 Just what these 
limits are is a matter of normative significance and considerable intellectual interest, 
but we cannot say much about the question here. But it is worth emphasizing the 
various gaps between what might be construed as the ideal policy or the ideal law and 
what gets realized on the ground. In particular:  
 
(a) The ideal law many not be the law that is most likely to emerge from political 
processes. Those processes involve inevitable compromises between the 
interests of specific influential bodies, and with what an often ill-informed 
electorate can be induced to vote for, and what vote-hungry politicians can be 
induced to promote. What finally emerges as law may lie a long way from 
what the original designer has in mind.  
(b) The actual law that emerges from the political process has to be interpreted by 
judges, who may have their own biases and agendas.  
(c) The law as it applies ‘on the street’ will be subject to the culture of the police 
force. There must remain an element of discretion that lies with individual 
police officers and their decisions as to which laws to enforce and whom to 
focus their enforcement efforts on. 
(d) The behavioural response by the general public can be unpredictable – 
compliance can be secured in ways that legislators did not intend, or actions 
to avoid or evade the law can have worse effects than the actions the law is 
designed to proscribe. 
 
None of these considerations means that legislative (or other policy) intervention 
in the face of defective norms is unduly dangerous or presumptively inappropriate. It is 
merely to underline a set of considerations that policymakers and legislators, by virtue 
of their location in the law-making process, are disposed to overlook or underestimate.  
 
 
IV   CONCLUSION 
 
Our object in this paper has been to explore the role of social norms as possible 
sources of social order – mainly with an eye to the contrast between norms and 
legislation. We have argued that many social norms function as invisible hands, or 
socially beneficial emergent orders. But equally, we have conceded that norms can be 
perverse. They can continue to operate when the conditions that favoured their 
emergence have long since changed. They can support conditions that significantly 
favour some groups over others. They can even serve to make almost everyone who is 
subject to them worse off. And we have emphasized that, though it may be tempting to 
think of legislation and the processes by which legislation is generated and 
implemented as lying beyond and above the operation of social norms, this view is 
mistaken. There is no deus ex machina available.  
We are suspicious of drawing any general conclusions from accounts of instances 
where norms have worked well – where they seem to have solved coordination or 
prisoner’s dilemma problems (or what might have been such problems if the relevant 
norms had not been in play). We do think that there is an important distinction between 
large number and small number interactions and that norms are more likely to arise and 
prove stable in small number cases. Where norms emerge locally, there is likely to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  Even when they are not blind, they may be induced to background such limits in their public 
conduct. How many politicians have, for example, been forced to intervene in situations that 
they believe they should not because to ‘fail to act’ would be seen by the general public as an 
inadmissible confession of the politicians’ own impotence! 
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an important adjudicative role for government action (and possibly legislation) as the 
distinct norms of local groups come into conflict.  
On the other hand, any broad evaluation of norms as sources of social order 
should ask the ‘compared to what?’ question. The limits and imperfections of norms 
must be set against the necessary limits and imperfections of legislative ‘solutions’. 
Those limits and imperfections are not always obvious to those who design such 
solutions. By their nature, ‘visible’ processes tend to have more advocates than 
‘invisible’ processes – that is just part of the upshot of being ‘invisible’. In that sense, 
norms may have more going for them than many legislators and would-be policy 
advisors are apt to recognize.  
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